Relief for the Poorest of All: How the Proposed Bankruptcy Reform Would Impact Women and Children by Wellman, Ame C.
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
Volume 6 
2001 
Relief for the Poorest of All: How the Proposed Bankruptcy 
Reform Would Impact Women and Children 
Ame C. Wellman 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ame C. Wellman, Relief for the Poorest of All: How the Proposed Bankruptcy Reform Would Impact 
Women and Children, 6 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 273 (2001), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol6/iss1/13 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
273 
Relief for the Poorest of All: How the Proposed 
Bankruptcy Reform Would Impact 
Women and Children 
Ame Wellman* 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 1980, the United States has witnessed an explosion in 
filings for personal bankruptcies.1 Filings have increased over four-
fold in less than two decades.2 The United States witnessed a record 
1.42 million filings in 1998 alone,3 representing one out of every 
sixty-eight households in the United States,4 and the trend shows no 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2001, Washington University School of Law. 
 1. The United States Bankruptcy Code provides several different chapters under which 
to file for bankruptcy relief. Each chapter provides a different type of relief for individuals, 
businesses, or family farms. Personal bankruptcy is filed under Chapters Seven and Thirteen of 
the United States Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 701-01 (1978); § 1301-13 (1978). Chapter 
Seven, Liquidation, provides a discharge of most unsecured debts while allowing the debtor to 
retain a substantial portion of personal property. The trustee collects all non-exempt property of 
the debtor and distributes the proceeds from its sale to the creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 704(1), § 726. 
Creditor claims for the exempt assets are terminated. Chapter Seven is sometimes known as the 
“fresh start” provision, or a “straight bankruptcy,” and represents 70% of all bankruptcies filed.  
 Under Chapter Thirteen, Rehabilitation or Reorganization, debtors make regular payments 
to creditors for a certain number of years according to a court -approved plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1322. 
The debtor is permitted to remain in possession of the debtor’s assets if the debtor abides by the 
plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b). 
 The decision whether to file under Chapter Seven or Chapter Thirteen is primarily 
voluntary, although Chapter Thirteen contains some restrictions as to who may file. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1325. Chapter Thirteen requires that debtors have regular income, as defined by 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(27), and debts under a certain threshold. Id.  
 2. The newest figures on consumer bankruptcy filings show that between 1980 and 1999, 
filings increased from 287,570 in 1980 to 1,281,581 in 1999. Consumer filings represented 
97.12% of all filings in 1999. American Bankruptcy Institute, US Bankruptcy Filing 1980-1998 
(Business, Non-Business, Total), available at http://www.abiworld.org/stats/1980annual.html 
(last visited May 1, 2001).  
 3. 145 CONG. REC. H2644 (daily ed. May 5, 1999) (statement of Rep. Sessions).  
 4. Brooks Jackson, World Today: Many to Blame for Bankruptcy Boom in America 
(CNN television broadcast, Nov. 4, 1999), available at http://cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/9911/ 
wt.10.html.  
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signs of slowing. 5  
Bankruptcy affects all persons in the United States. Creditors and 
retailers increase the cost of goods and services for all consumers to 
compensate for the financial loss caused by bankruptcy discharges.6 
Analysts estimate that the aggregate loss for each American family 
due to discharge of debts through bankruptcy was $550 each year in 
higher cost for credit, goods, and services.7 
Ironically, the growth in consumer bankruptcies is occurring 
within the context of a booming economy, low unemployment,8 and 
increased household incomes.9 More telling is the fact that between 
1978 and 1997, the amount of consumer debt grew over 650%.10 The 
Federal Reserve reported in 1997 that consumers’ debt grew at a rate 
that exceeded disposable income growth. 11  
The question remains: “Why there are so many individuals going 
broke in the midst of such a healthy economy?” The answer varies 
depending upon who is asked.12 Proponents of bankruptcy reform 
point the finger at the increasingly permissive attitude of society 
toward bankruptcy, the lack of responsibility of individuals to repay 
 
 5. Non-business filings for the first and second quarters of 2000 totaled 615,315 filings. 
ABI World, Personal Bankruptcy Filings By Quarter available at http://www.abiworld.org/ 
stats/newstatsfront.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2001) (data as of Apr. 12, 2001). 
 6. In 1991, the Accounting Office estimated that Chapter 7 cases involved $24.4 billion 
in assets. This included both business and non-business filings, although business filings only 
represent 6% of Chapter Seven cases. KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS, 
REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM (1997).  
 7. 145 CONG.  REC. H2644, supra note 3. The Senator, however, did not specify which 
study this figure came from.  
 8. In October, 1999, the United States Census Bureau reported the unemployment rate 
was 4.1%. The United States currently has the lowest unemployment rate than it has seen in the 
last quarter-century. Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Creditors Lead Push to Curb Bankruptcy , N.Y. 
TIMES, May 10, 1998, Sec. 3, at 10; 145 CONG. REC. H2644, supra note 3.  
 9. In 1980, the median family income was $31,095 according to the Census Bureau and 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. In 1999 it was $42,769. In contrast, the median family income for 
Chapter Seven filers in 1999 was $21,450. Torri Still, Bankruptcy Bar Bashes Reform Bill, 157 
N.J.L.J. 344 (1999).  
 10. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R.833 Before the Subcommittee on 
Commercial and Administrative Law, Mar. 18, 1999, available at http://www.house.gov/ 
judiciary/106-rouk.htm (last visited May 1, 2001). 
 11. Id. In fact, Congresswoman Marge Roukema stated that between 1986 and 1996, real 
annual per capita disposable income grew by over 13% while personal bankruptcies more than 
doubled. Id. 
 12. For further discussion of this apparent anomaly, see Gordon Bermant, Consumer 
Filings in a Complex Economy, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22 (1999).  
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the money they borrow, and the rise in “bankruptcy mill” law firms.13 
These proponents describe the increase in bankruptcy filings as a 
“moral crisis”14 in the United States where “bankruptcies of 
convenience” are granted frequently.15 Opponents, on the other hand, 
blame the credit card industry and its loose standards for extending 
credit,16 deceptive lending practices, and high interest rates. They 
criticize creditors for profiting from the same practices that force 
many individuals into bankruptcy.  
Women and children remain one of the most vulnerable groups in 
the United States economy. Although, on average, the real median 
income of female-headed households increased in 1997,17 over thirty-
one percent still lived below the poverty line. This statistic is 
staggering when contrasted with that of married couples living below 
the poverty line—slightly over 5%.18 On average, when women 
divorce, their standards of living sharply decline, regardless of what 
their standards of living may have been while they were married.19  
 
 13. The term “bankruptcy mill” is generally used to refer to law firms which earn the bulk 
of their income by encouraging consumers to file for bankruptcy. The firms charge a flat rate 
for assisting individuals in completing the forms necessary for filing; a task usually performed 
by trained legal assistants. Because their income is based on processing as many bankruptcies 
as they can, they are reputed to discourage debtors from trying to repay their loans, even when 
they want to.  
 14. 145 CONG. REC. S14248 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1999) (statement of Sen. Grassley).  
 15. Rep. Linder remarked that taking into account the increasing number of bankruptcies 
despite economic growth and low unemployment, one: can realistically only come to only one 
conclusion: bankruptcies of convenience have provided a loophole for those who are financially 
able to pay their debts but simply have found a way to avoid personal responsibility and escape 
their financial responsibilities. 145 CONG.  REC. H2648 (daily ed. May 5, 1999) (statement of 
Rep. Linder).  
 16. Consumer borrowing has grown seven-fold since the last time that the Bankruptcy 
Code was reformed in 1978. See ABI World, U.S. Bankruptcy Filings 1980-1998 (Business, 
Non-Business, Total), at http://www.abiworld.org/stats/1980annual.html (last visited May 1, 
2001) (reporting 287,570 non-business filings for 1980 and 1,281,581 for 1999).  
 17. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports: Consumer Income, Poverty in 
the United States (1997), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/3/98pubs/p60-01.pdf (last 
visited May 1, 2001). In 1997, 31.6% of female households with no husband present lived 
below the poverty line. The poverty line threshold is $16,400 in annual income. Id.  
 18. Id. In 1997, married couples living below the poverty line totaled 5.2% according to 
the United States Census Bureau. Id.  
 19. Peter C. Alexander, Divorce and the Dischargeability of Debts: Focusing on Women 
as Creditors in Bankruptcy, 43 CATH . U. L. REV. 351, 364-65 (1994). Alexander cites a 1981 
California study where women experienced a seventy-three percent decline in their standard of 
living. Id. at 365 n.70  (citing Lenore J. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and 
Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards,  28 UCLA L. REV. 
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Not surprisingly, individual women are the fastest growing 
segment of the population for bankruptcy.20 In the second half of 
1998 and the first quarter of 1999, single -filing women represented 
34.6% of all bankruptcy cases.21 Estimates indicate that 540,000 
women will file bankruptcy in 1999 alone.22 Divorced women as a 
group are most likely to file bankruptcy,23 and unmarried women in 
bankruptcy are worse off than both married women and unmarried 
men.24  
This Note will argue how the current bankruptcy reform, similar 
to that proposed in the previous two Congresses, is a “mixed bag” for 
women and children. An act similar in form to what we have seen 
will surely target the small group of debtors abusing the system, as 
hoped, but it will also negatively impact the most economically 
vulnerable members of society, namely women and children. While 
Congress has taken affirmative steps to make the United States 
Bankruptcy Code (the Code) more responsive to the needs of women 
and children that receive support payments from men who have filed 
for bankruptcy, these provisions sometimes fall short or are ill-
conceived.25 In addition, reformers have failed to adequately address 
the procedural hurdles that the poorest Americans encounter when 
they are in particular need of bankruptcy relief. The Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1999 (the Act), therefore, must be altered to further 
 
1181, 1181-1251 (1981)).  
 20. Since the early 1980s, the number of women filing bankruptcy alone has risen faster 
than men filing alone or married couples. The proportion of women filers increased from 
32.79% in July, 1997 to 33.82% to 34.43% to 36.28% in June, 1999. The fact that the number 
of women filing bankruptcy is increasing at the same time that the overall number of 
bankruptcies filed is rising means that the number of women filing is growing even more 
dramatically. Teresa A. Sullivan & Elizabeth Warren, More Women in Bankruptcy, AMERICAN 
BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE, available at http://www.abiworld.org/research/morewomen.html 
(July 30, 1999) (last visited May 1, 2001).  
 21. Id.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Heather Brewer, Snap Judgments, BUS. L. TODAY, Jan./Feb. 2000, at 4.  
 24. TERESA A. SULLIVAN , ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS WE 
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS, BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 147-59 (1989).  
 25. Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. I, §101, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified primarily as 11 
U.S.C.), amended by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, and by the Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family 
Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol6/iss1/13
p273 Wellman.doc  2/28/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2001]  Relief for the Poorest of All 277 
 
 
address the special needs of women and children.26  
Part I of this Note will discuss the legislative history of the Act 
and the specific provisions it proposes. The purpose and public policy 
behind the Act will be examined. The proposals will then be 
compared with the provisions currently embodied within the Code. 
This Note will specifically outline provisions within the Code that 
relate to women and children who seek to collect alimony and child 
support from men who have declared bankruptcy, and provisions that 
will make it harder for female heads of household to attain 
bankruptcy relief for themselves.  
The proposals of the Act will be analyzed in Part II according to 
the purported fundamental purpose of a bankruptcy system—a fair 
and equitable system that allows a fresh start for those who really 
need it—as well as the intent of the Act’s sponsors. This Part will 
address unforeseen or inadvertent consequences of the Act’s 
provisions, as well as those consequences that adequately meet the 
needs of women and children.  
Part III of this Note, in conclusion, will outline recommendations 
for an equitable bankruptcy system that meets the needed reform’s 
goals.  
I. HISTORY 
Bankruptcy began as a way to give “the honest but unfortunate 
debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, 
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing 
debt.”27 In the last few decades, however, bankruptcy has become a 
common occurrence.28 The vast number of filings for bankruptcy led 
the public to question whether the individuals filing were really the 
“honest but unfortunate” sort of debtors that bankruptcy was 
originally intended to assist. Bankruptcy was overhauled in 1994 in 
response to this public concern.29 Nevertheless, filings continued to 
rise30 and consequently Congress has been receptive to the American 
 
 26. Cite the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999. 
 27. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).  
 28. See supra notes 1-4.  
 29. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106.  
 30. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.  
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public’s call for another overhaul.31  
Congress responded to the public call for bankruptcy reform 
during the 105th Congressional session when the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1998 was proposed.32 Its sponsors introduced the bill intending 
to make bankruptcy a more difficult option for those who could 
actually afford to pay their debts.33 Although both chambers passed 
the bill,34 it was not adopted at the end of the session because it died 
in the conference committee.35 Congress did not rejected it on its 
merits, however.36 Instead, it died because of numerous “rider” 
amendments tacked on by the Senate, most notably a minimum wage 
increase.37 Due to the unpopularity of these rider amendments, the 
Conference Committee let bankruptcy reform quietly die.38  
Bankruptcy reform resurfaced in the 106th Congress. The 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 199939 is almost identical to the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998.40 While its fate is still uncertain, the 
Senate passed the minimum-wage provision that seemingly killed the 
 
 31. According to studies and polls, the American public desires bankruptcy reform. 
However, the sudden push for reform may in part be due to intense lobbying by the credit 
industry rather than by pressure from legislative constituents. For reports and statistics on the 
main players in the lobbying campaign for bankruptcy reform, see Jennifer She,  Money in 
Politics Alert, THE CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, at http://www.opensecrets.or/alerts/ 
v4/alrtv4n16.asp (last visited May 1, 2001); Dan Morgan, Creditors’ Money Talks Louder in 
Bankruptcy Debate: Consumer Groups Fight New Curbs on Insolvent Debtors,  WASH. POST, 
June 1, 1999, at A4; Hershey, Jr., supra note 8.  
 32. H.R. 3150, S. 1301. The last major overhaul to the Bankruptcy system was in 1978, in 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. This Act was signed into law on November 6, 1978 and 
repealed and replaced the National Bankruptcy Act of 1898.  
 33. See infra  notes 42, 117-23 and accompanying text.  
 34. H.R. 3150 passed the House on June 10, 1998 by a vote of 306-118. Roll No. 225. 
Amended S. 1301 passed September 23, 1998 by 97-1. Record Vote No. 284.  
 35. A bill is sent to the Conference Committee if it is passed in the second chamber in a 
form different than the one passed in the originating chamber. The Congressional session ended 
in May, 1999.  
 36. This is obvious by the passage of the bill with significant margins in both chambers. 
The amendments did not fundamentally change the essence of the Bankruptcy Bill itself.  
 37. See, e.g., Fair Minimum Wage Act of 1998, S. Cong. Rec. S9942 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 
1998) (Kennedy Amendment No. 3540).  
 38. See House Passes Bill to Toughen Bankruptcy Laws: White House Threatens Veto 
(May 6, 1999), available at http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/05/06/ 
bankruptcy (last visited May 1, 2001).  
 39. H.R. 833, S. 625.  
 40. H.R. 3150, S. 1301.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol6/iss1/13
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Act during the previous session. 41 However, even if the Act does not 
pass in this Congressional session, members of Congress, bankruptcy 
practitioners, and law professors predict that it will reappear in the 
near future.42  
The legislative history of the latest version of bankruptcy reform 
outlines the purpose of the Act. Its sponsors43 seek to reduce what 
they perceive as the widespread abuse of the bankruptcy system. 
They aim to construct systematic safeguards that would turn 
bankruptcy into a strictly needs-based system44 where those who 
really are in need of relief are identified through objective evidence 
before relief is granted.45 They want bankruptcy to become both a 
less attractive and more difficult option for those who can actually 
afford to repay at least some of their debts.46 The Act’s sponsors hope 
to restore bankruptcy to its former role—a last resort instead of first 
response to a financial crises.47  
The sponsors’ loftier goal is to restore both consumer and creditor 
responsibility in economic society.48 They believe that a system49 that 
 
 41. The Domenici Amendment, No. 2547, passed on November 9, 1999 by a vote of 54-
44. This is significant because on September 21, 1999, a vote to invoke closure failed to pass 
the Senate by seven votes. The vote was intended to prevent the addition of non-germane 
amendments like the ones that killed the bill in the previous Congress. When the vote did not 
pass, many predicted that this would make it virtually impossible to pass the legislation again 
because of the Republican commitment to oppose the minimum wage increase. 145 CONG. 
REC. S14129 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1999) (Domenici Amendment No. 2547). 
 42. Roundtable, Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Roundtable, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 
3, 3-4 (1999) (remarks of Samuel J. Gerdano).  
 43. The Act’s sponsors in the United States House of Representatives are Rep. George W. 
Gekas (R-Pa.) and Jim Moran (D-Va). The sponsors in the Senate are Charles E. Grassley (R-
Iowa) and Richard J. Durbin (D-Ill.). Robert D. Hershey, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1998, sec. 3, at 
10.  
 44. Systematic safeguards to achieve a needs-based system would take the form of a 
means test. See discussion infra  notes 117-22 and accompanying text.  
 45. One of the Act’s proponents in the Senate remarked that the current law, where the 
bankruptcy judge has discretion in granting relief, is a “case-by-case investigation” and “turns 
on little more than the personal predilections of the judge. This chaotic system mocks the rule 
of law, and has resulted in unfairness and inequality for debtors and creditors alike.” 145 CONG. 
REC. S11089 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1999).  
 46. See infra  notes 117-22 and accompanying text.  
 47. Matthew Tully, House-Passed Bankruptcy Rewrite Demands More From Debtors, 
ALL POLITICS CNN, at http://cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/06/16/cq/bankruptcy.html (June 
16, 1998) (last visited May 1, 2001).  
 48. “Personal responsibility has to be returned to our society.” Rep. George W. Gekas. 
Also, although not a sponsor of the bill, Rep. Pryce of Ohio echoed the sentiment of personal 
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affords filers only the amount of debt relief needed—no more and no 
less—would restore public confidence.50  
However, to create an equitable system that would meet these 
objectives, the unique situation of women and children requires 
consideration. The current bankruptcy system and the proposed 
changes attempt to address this issue.  
A. Comparing the Act with the Current Bankruptcy Code 
1. Women and Children Collecting Alimony or Child Support 
from Men Filing Bankruptcy 
Women and children become creditors when men fail to meet 
their financial obligations pursuant to alimony or child support 
contracts.51 They attempt to collect overdue payments by assigning 
debts to another party and garnishing wages, just like ordinary 
creditors. Unlike other creditors, women and children often look 
solely to that debtor for their financial survival.52 These women and 
children may seek public assistance or file bankruptcy if they do not 
receive the money owed them. As a result, they deserve special 
consideration and protection by the bankruptcy system.53  
The primary purpose of personal bankruptcy is to provide a means 
for insolvent debtors to wipe the slate clean of debts and start anew.54 
 
responsibility when she remarked that “when intelligent citizens ignore basic common sense by 
spending outside of their means, we need to establish a reasonable level of accountability and 
demand some personal responsibility to protect those who have extended credit to them in good 
faith.” 145 CONG. REC. H2646 (daily ed. May 5, 1999).  
 49. “The arbitrary nature of the process has also undermined public confidence in the 
fairness and efficiency of the consumer bankruptcy system.” 145 CONG . REP. S11089 (daily ed. 
Sept. 21, 1999) (statement of Todd Zewicky and James White).  
 50. See infra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.  
 51. For a more detailed discussion of women as creditors in bankruptcy see Alexander, 
supra note 19.  
 52. See Shine v. Shine, 802 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1986) (stating that there is a strong policy 
interest in protecting women and children from losing alimony and child support payments 
owed by an ex-spouse who has filed for bankruptcy).  
 53. NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT § 1.4.4 (1997).  
 54. The court in Blaemire v. Sinton, 229 B.R. 665, 667 (1999), outlined the purpose of the 
bankruptcy system, saying: 
In individual cases, a central purpose of bankruptcy is to provide a process by which 
insolvent debtors can reorder their affairs, make peace with their creditors, and enjoy a 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol6/iss1/13
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However, the policy in favor of giving debtors a fresh start does not 
extend to all debts.55 The Code carves out exceptions for support 
payments to one’s dependents.56  
Under the current system, some men are able to escape their 
support obligations by filing bankruptcy. This becomes particularly 
likely when past due payments have been assigned to third parties for 
collection. In bankruptcy, a debt is dischargeable 57 unless a statutory 
exemption applies.58 Although support obligations are expressly 
excepted from discharge,59 savvy men or bankruptcy attorneys have 
learned to exploit loopholes to avoid their responsibilities.60 When 
 
new opportunity in life with a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure 
and discouragement of preexisting debt, or put another way, bankruptcy is a means to 
afford a fresh start to an “honest but unfortunate debtor.”  
See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1991).  
 55. Congress codified exceptions to the general rule in 11 U.S.C. § 523. Congress 
believed that some debts either “fail to meet the bankruptcy objective of giving a fresh start 
only to honest debtors or are considered to be of paramount societal importance (such as tax 
obligations, and alimony and child support).” H.R. REP. NO. 103-835, at 34 (1994), reprinted in 
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3342.  
 56. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (1995). See infra  notes 89-91.  
 57. A debtor is “discharged” when he is released from the obligation to repay his debt. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 463 (6th ed. 1990).  
 58. Yvonne M. Lada, Note, Something Every Divorce Attorney Should Know about 
Bankruptcy Law, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 735, 735 (1999) (citing Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 
(1979)).  
 59. The provision excepting such obligations reads as follows:  
A discharge under section 727, 1141, . . . 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does 
not discharge an individual debtor from any debt . . . to a spouse, former spouse, or 
child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, 
in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of 
record, determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a 
governmental unit, or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent that: 
 (A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or 
otherwise (other than debts assigned pursuant to Section 402(a)(26) of the Social 
Security Act, or any such debt which has been assigned to the Federal Government or 
to a State or any political subdivision of such State); or . . . 
 (B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance or support, 
unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support . . . .  
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(A)-(B) (1993).  
 60. Senator Grassley remarked during the Senate debate:  
I want to point out that some bankruptcy lawyers actually advertise that they can help 
deadbeat dads get out of paying their child support and other marital obligations. One 
bankruptcy lawyer has even written a book entitled “Discharging Marital Obligations 
in Bankruptcy.” 
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this happens, the bankruptcy system inadvertently allows the 
individual to receive debt relief at the expense of his dependents.  
a. Definition of “Domestic Support Obligation” 
The Act addresses these concerns through several provisions that 
relate to “domestic support obligations.” First, the Act would add 
“domestic support obligation” to the general definition provision of 
the Code.61 The current provision does not include such a definition.62 
Section 523 requires that debt in the nature of alimony, maintenance, 
or support owed to a former spouse or child is to be 
nondischargeable.63 The debt must be “in connection with a 
separation agreement, divorce decree . . . or property settlement 
agreement . . ..”64 However, the statute does not define what kind of 
debts constitute those “in the nature of” alimony or maintenance, and 
support is not defined by the statute.65 Hence, courts look to case law 
for its meaning. 66  
Bankruptcy courts look to the intent of the parties in making the 
divorce decree and use factors to determine the nature of the debt.67 
The number of factors and the weight given to factor varies from 
 
145 CONG. REP. S14248 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1999) (statement of Sen. Grassley).  
 61. H.R. 833 § 138, S. 625 § 211. Congress defines fundamental terms used throughout 
the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101. 
 62. See 11 U.S.C. § 101.  
 63. “Alimony” is commonly understood to mean the “sustenance or support of the wife by 
her divorced husband.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY  73. Usually this definition contemplates 
monetary payments at regular intervals. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B).  
 In 1903, Congress codified the common law practice of exempting alimony and child 
support payments from discharge in bankruptcy. This amendment to the 1898 Act read that “[a] 
discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all his provable debts, whether allowable 
in full or in part, except such as . . . are for alimony due or to become due, or for maintenance or 
support of wife or child.” Act of Feb. 5, 1903, § 5, 32 Stat. 797, 798 (repealed 1978). This 
provision was found to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution in 1977, 
and was reenacted with gender-neutral language in 1978.  
 64. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B).  
 65. See id.  
 66. The bankruptcy court makes an independent evaluation regarding the nature of the 
obligation that arises from the divorce decree. The determination is controlled by federal 
bankruptcy law, not state law. See In Re Garrard, 151 B.R. 598, 601 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993); 
In Re Harrell, 754 F.2d 902 (11th Cir. 1985).  
 67. Alexander, supra note 19, at 351, 361-62.  
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court to court and among judges.68 If the party challenging 
dischargeability fails to carry its burden of proof by a preponderance 
of the evidence, then the debt is determined to be in the nature of a 
property settlement and is fully dischargeable in bankruptcy. 69 Thus, 
it seems, the Legislature allowed the courts to fill the gap it created 
by leaving the definition of “alimony” and “child support” open to 
interpretation.  
The Act defines “domestic support obligation” broadly and 
explicitly, and takes back the discretion previously left to the courts. 
The definition includes alimony, child support, paternity settlements 
and obligations to reimburse governmental units.70 The definition 
moreover includes obligations to governmental units, that reflect the 
sponsor’ desire to prevent debts assigned to third parties from 
escaping the judicially-created exception. 71 The impact of this 
provision, however, is relative to the other provisions of the Act it.72 
The definition explicitly states the claims Congress intends to include 
 
 68. See In Re Bowsman, 128 B.R. 485, 487 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991), finding six factors to 
nondischargeability, namely: 
(1) Whether the obligation under consideration is subject to contingencies such as 
death or remarriage. (2) Whether the payment was fashioned in order to balance 
disparate incomes of the parties. (3) Whether the obligation is payable in installments 
or a lump sum. (4) Whether there are minor children involved in a marriage requiring 
support. (5) The respective physical health of the spouse and the level of education. (6) 
Whether, in fact, there was need for spousal support at the time of the circumstances of 
the particular case. 
Daulton v. Daulton, 139 B.R. 708 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1992) (citing twenty factors to determining 
dischargeability, including the age and health of the parties; whether the parties had counsel; 
whether the parties had made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of rights; the length 
of the marriage; and other special or unique circumstances of the parties).  
 69. In Re Burch, 100 B.R. 585, 589 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989).  
 70. H.R. 833, 106th Cong. § 138 (2d Sess. 1999); S. 625, 106th Cong. § 211 (2d Sess. 
1999). 
 71. This is not to say that domestic support obligations assigned to third parties always 
escape nondischargeability. However, they are required to pass the “nature of the debt” test, and 
these debts are usually more difficult for the challenger to establish their burden of proof.  
 72. Section 101 would apply to §§ 139-44 of H.R. 833, supra note 70. These provisions 
are, in order: “[p]riorities for claims for domestic support obligations,” “[r]equirements to 
obtain confirmation and discharge in cases involving domestic support obligations,” 
“[e]xceptions to automatic stay in domestic support obligation proceedings,” 
“[n]ondischargeability of certain debts for alimony, maintenance, and support,” “[c]ontinued 
liability of property,” and “[p]rotection of domestic support claims against preferential transfer 
motions.” Id. Not all of these provisions, however, will be covered in this Note.  
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in such domestic support provisions and to protect to from 
dischargeability.73  
b. The Automatic Stay 
The Act addresses the operation of the automatic stay74 in 
domestic support claims.75 The automatic stay generally operates to 
prevent creditors from collecting on debts once the individual has 
filed for bankruptcy. 76 The automatic stay takes effect as soon as the 
bankruptcy petition is filed with the court and provides a respite for 
the debtor from his creditors.77 Creditors are prohibited from filing 
suits against the debtor to collect money, repossess secured property, 
or garnish wages.78  
Under the current version of the Code, section 362 exempts 
alimony and child support obligations from protection under the 
automatic stay. 79 However, men who owe domestic support 
 
 73. See supra note 70. 
 74. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1993 & Supp. 2000). “Except as provided in subsection (b) of this 
section, a petition filed under section 301, 302 or 303 of this title . . . operates as a stay, 
applicable to all entities . . ..” Id.  
 75. H.R. 833, 106th Cong. § 152 (1st. Sess. 1999). No parallel provision exists in S. 625.  
 76. The Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, Senate Report No. 95-989, described the 
automatic stay as: 
[O]ne of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives 
the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all 
harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or 
reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove him 
into bankruptcy.  
Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, S. REP. NO. 95-989, reprinted in  BANKRUPTCY CODE, 
RULES, AND OFFICIAL FORMS, 1999 LAW SCHOOL EDITION III (West Group 1999). The 
court is not required to sign or issue an order; filing a petition with supporting documentation is 
sufficient t o activate the automatic stay. BLACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY 134 (citing In re Artishon, 
Bkrtcy. Minn., 39 B.R. 890, 893; Jones v. Wood (In re Wood), Bkrtcy. Idaho, 33 B.R. 320, 
321). The automatic stay applies only to pre-petition creditors. However, some pre-petition 
creditors may be exempt from the automatic stay under § 362(b) or may be able to lift the 
automatic stay through the procedures set out in § 362 (d)-(g).  
 77. The other function of the automatic stay is to preserve the estate. This prevents 
unfairness for creditors by disallowing one creditor to rush in and collect from the debtor before 
any other creditors are able to do so. The bankruptcy system aims to equalize creditors in order 
to provide for a collective solution to the debtor’s insolvency. GROSS, supra note 6, at 41-43.  
 78. Gross, supra note 6, at 41.  
 79. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(B). The provision reads, in pertinent part: 
The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title . . . does not operate 
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obligations and file for bankruptcy sometimes avoid collection of 
past due payments when they are assigned to third parties for 
collection. These debts, when assigned to a private collection agency, 
are classified like any other debts assigned to a collection agency. 
Further, under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,80 debts assigned 
to the government are not protected by the automatic stay.81  
The Act would change section 362 in two ways.82 First, Act would 
amend the provision to read “domestic support obligations,” 
replacing “alimony, maintenance or support.”83 This is a broader term 
than would be adopted in section 101 and would exclude more debts 
from the protection of the automatic stay than at present—including 
debts assigned to third parties and governmental entities.84 Most 
categories of child support would additionally be excluded from the 
automatic stay.85 For example, a wage deduction order imposed to 
enforce a domestic support obligation would be ineligible for 
protection. Similarly, restrictions or suspensions of licenses imposed 
to enforce domestic support obligations would be unaffected by the 
automatic stay. 86 This includes those restrictions pursuant to federal 
law on driver’s, professional, and recreational licenses to enforce 
payments on overdue support obligations.87 Therefore, a state could 
impose penalties or garnishments to enforce a debtor’s overdue 
support payments, even after he has filed for bankruptcy relief.  
 
as a stay . . . under subsection (a) of this section . . . of the commencement or 
continuation of an action or proceeding for . . . the establishment of paternity; or… the 
establishment or modification of an order for alimony, maintenance, or support; or . . . 
of the collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not property 
of the estate[.]  
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1)-(2)(A)(i), (ii), (B). See also In re Schock, 37 B.R. 399, 400 
(Bankr. D. N.D. 1984); In re Cunningham, 9 B.R. 70, 71 (Bankr. D. N.M.1981).  
 80. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (Oct. 22, 1994).  
 81. 11 U.S.C. § 362. 
 82. H.R. 833, 106th Cong. § 138 (1st Sess. 1999); S. 625, 106th Cong. § 214 (2000), 
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/C?c106:./temp/~c106H1m4zx. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. § 141. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.  
 85. Supra  note 82.  
 86. Supra note 82  
 87. See, e.g., Title IV-D of the Federal Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 (1994).  
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c. Property Settlement Agreements as a Part of a Divorce 
A woman will frequently accept a lower alimony or support 
payment in a divorce settlement in exchange for an agreement in 
which her former husband bears more responsibility for the marital 
debt.88 This leaves more disposable income free from credit card 
payments and other bills, so she may support herself and her children. 
This arrangement, however, only works when her former husband 
actually pays those debts. If her former husband files for bankruptcy 
and these debts are discharged for him, this leaves her with the 
obligation to pay these debts under the current version of the Code.89 
Although support payments are always nondischargeable, payments 
resulting from a divorce decree or separation agreement that are not 
supportive are evaluated using a balancing test to determine 
dischargeability.90 The test evaluates whether the nonfiling spouse, 
deprived of the property settlement payment, would be more 
burdened than would the filing spouse if forced to make the 
payments.91 If the nonfiling spouse fails the test and the bankruptcy 
 
 88. These arrangements are also called “hold harmless agreements.” 
 89. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (Supp. 2000). The provision reads as follows: 
A discharge . . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt . . . not of the 
kind described in paragraph (5) [regarding alimony and child support payments] that is 
incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce or separation or in connection with a 
separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, a 
determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit 
. . .  
Id. Therefore, if a woman is jointly liable for a debt, such as a joint holder on a credit card 
account, an agreement from a divorce proceeding has no bearing on her legal obligation to pay 
the debt. The divorce settlement is considered solely between the woman and her husband—not 
between the parties and the lender. Therefore, the lender could still collect from the woman 
following her husband’s bankruptcy. She could, however, file suit against her former husband 
to enforce the divorce agreement.  
 90. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (Supp. 2000). 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)(B) (Supp. 2000). Property 
settlements pursuant to a divorce decree or separation agreement are subject to a balancing test 
to determine whether “discharging such debt would result in a benefit to the debtor that 
outweighs the detrimental consequences to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor . . ..” 
Id. 
 91. Id. The Congressional Record reflects the purpose behind the inclusion of the 
balancing test: 
In some instances, divorcing spouses have agreed to make payments of marital debts, 
holding the other spouse harmless from those debts, in exchange for a reduction in 
alimony payments. In other cases, spouses have agreed to lower alimony payments 
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court decides to discharge the debt of her former husband,92 then the 
woman suffers the worst of both worlds—the burden of the original 
debt as well as lower support payments.93  
The Act would exempt from discharge all property settlements 
that arise out of divorce proceedings.94 This would remove the 
balancing test from the Code altogether, thereby achieving (ask 
author to clarify).95  
d. Prioritization in the Distribution Of Assets 
The Act would reprioritize domestic support obligations in the 
distribution of assets.96 In section 507, the Code prioritizes section 
507 payments for expenses and debts in the distribution of the 
debtor’s assets.97 First priority is given to the administrative expenses 
of the estate and to any other related fees and charges.98 This 
 
based on a larger property settlement. If such “hold harmless” and property settlement 
obligations are not found to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, they 
are dischargeable under current law. The nondebtor spouse may be saddled with 
substantial debt and little or no alimony or support. This subsection will make such 
obligations nondischargeable in cases where the debtor has the ability to pay them and 
the detriment to the nondebtor spouse from their nonpayment outweighs the benefit to 
the debtor of discharging such debts.  
140 Cong. Rec. H10, 752-01 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994).  
 92. Under the current system, the bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction over 
§ 523(a)(15) complaints.  
 93. “If such ‘hold harmless’ and property settlement obligations are not found to be in the 
nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, they are dischargeable under current law. The 
nondebtor spouse may be saddled with substantial debt and little or no alimony or support.” 
H.R. REP. NO. 103-835, at 54 (1994), reprinted in  1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3363. See David M. 
Susswein, Note, Divorce Related Property Division v. Alimony, Maintenance and Support in 
the Bankruptcy Context: A Distinction Without a Difference?, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 679 (1994). 
See also Jana B. Singer, Divorce Obligations and Bankruptcy Discharge: Rethinking the 
Support/Property Distinction, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 43 (1993) (further discussing the 
differing treatment of support payments and property settlements in bankruptcy). 
 94. H.R. 833, § 142; S. 625, § 215.  
 95. Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Provisions of H.R. , ABI World homepage at 
http://www.abiworld.org/legis/bills. The need for Bankruptcy Court jurisdiction would be 
removed as well. Id.  
 96. H.R. 833, § 139; S. 625, § 212.  
 97. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (Supp. 2000). In a Chapter Seven bankruptcy case, the trustee reduces 
the debtor’s assets to cash for distribution to the creditors after a determination of the debtor’s 
eligibility for Chapter Seven relief. See also 11 U.S.C. § 704 (discussing the duties of trustees).  
 98. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1). “First, administrative expenses allowed under section 503(b) of 
this title, and any fees and charges assessed against the estate under chapter 123 of title 28.” Id.  
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encompasses payments to the trustee,99 appraisers, brokers, and 
auctioneers involved in the assessment and distribution of the 
debtor’s estate.100 Following the settlement of administrative claims, 
the other claims that are given priority include wages owed to the 
debtor’s employees, contributions to employees’ benefit plans, 
property loans and taxes.101 Presently, domestic support obligations 
are in the seventh priority tier, and are therefore not paid until 
priorities one through six are satisfied. 102 Moreover, these domestic 
support claims specifically exclude debts assigned to third parties for 
collection as unsecured creditor claims.103 Unsecured creditors’ 
claims, on the other hand, are not considered a priority for repayment 
and are generally dischargeable.104 
In contrast, the Act would move domestic support claims to the 
first priority tier.105 These claims would thereby outrank 
administrative claims.106 Debts assigned to governmental entities 
 
 99. The Bankruptcy trustee is the “[p]erson appointed by the Bankruptcy Court or elected 
by creditors to take charge of debtors estates, to collect assets, to bring suit on debtor’s claims, 
to defend actions against it, and otherwise administer debtor’s estate.” BLACK ’S LAW 
DICTIONARY  147 (6th ed. 1990) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 321; 28 U.S.C. § 581).  
 100. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1).  
 101. 11 U.S.C. § 507. The claims prioritized in § 507 are as follows: (1) administrative 
expenses; (2) unsecured “involuntary gap” creditors; (3) compensation to employees; (4) 
contributions to employee benefit plains; (5) debts owed by owners of grain storage facilities; 
(6) debts owed by persons owning a fish storage or processing facility; (7) debts owed for 
property; (8) alimony or child support; and (9) taxes. Id. 
 102. 11 U.S.C. § 507(A)(7). The section reads as follows: 
Seventh, allowed claims for debts to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, 
for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with 
a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, 
determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit, 
or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent that such debt . . . (A) is 
assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise; or (B) 
includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such 
liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support.  
Id. Domestic support obligations were added to the list of priority claims in 1994. Id. 
 103. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(A). See also  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B).  
 104. The creditor can challenge the debt’s dischargeability pursuant to a provision under 
§ 523. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1993). These debts may become nondischargeable, however, if the 
debtor signs a reaffirmation agreement—an agreement to repay the debt that  is approved by the 
court. “Unsecured debt” is defined as “[d]ebt obligations that are not backed by pledged 
collateral or security agreement.” BLACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY  1539 (6th ed. 1990). 
 105. H.R. 833 § 139, S. 625, § 212.  
 106. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1).  
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would also take on priority status thereby giving effect to the Act’s 
proposed definitional change of “domestic support obligation.”107 
However, the amendment specifies that support payments to 
individuals are given priority over payments to the government.108 
Support payments to individuals would therefore receive the first 
distribution of the debtor’s assets.  
2. Women Filing for Bankruptcy 
a. Qualifying for Chapter Seven Bankruptcy 
A major feature of the Act is the means test, also called the 
“needs-based” bankruptcy approach.109 In its present form, the Code 
allows debtors in personal bankruptcy to elect either Chapter Seven 
or Chapter Thirteen, subject to a few restrictions.110 Generally, the 
Code contains a presumption in favor of granting relief to individuals 
who file a voluntary petition for Chapter Seven.111 If the court, 
however, finds that granting relief under Chapter Seven would result 
in “substantial abuse” of the provision,112 then the bankruptcy judge 
possesses wide discretion in determining whether or not to dismiss 
debtor’s petition. Alternatively, the debtor may elect to convert his 
case to Chapter Thirteen, if he qualifies.113 There are not, however, 
other explicit rules controlling the judge’s decision.  
The means test aims to channel debtors who can repay a certain 
portion of their debts into Chapter Thirteen.114 Chapter Thirteen 
 
 107. H.R. § 139, S. 625, § 212.  
 108. H.R. § 139, S. 625, § 212. 
 109. H.R. 833, § 101; S. 625, § 101; H.R. 833, § 102; S. 625, § 102.  
 110. Id.  
 111. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (Supp. 2000). The provision reads: “There shall be a presumption 
in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor.” Id.  
 112. Id. The provision allows the court to dismiss a case for cause, including “a case filed 
by an individual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds 
that the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter.” Id. The 
Code does not define “substantial abuse,” and thus its application appears to be left to the 
discretion of the bankruptcy judge.  
 113. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (Supp. 2000). To file for relief under Chapter Thirteen, a debtor is 
required to have a regular income, unsecured debts that total, in the aggregate, under $250,000, 
and secured debts that total less than $750,000. Id.  
 114. See supra note 1.  
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requires debtors to repay more unsecured creditors than under a 
traditional Chapter Seven filing. 115 The Act would remove the 
presumption in favor of Chapter Seven bankruptcy relief from the 
Code. “Substantial abuse,” presently grounds for dismissal or 
conversion,116 would be reduced to mere “abuse,” 117 and a finding of 
“abuse” in a given case would be determined by the means test.118  
The means test closes Chapter Seven to filers who are found to be 
presumptively able to repay a significant portion of their debts. The 
court would apply the proposed formula to their income and debts.119 
Debtors who earn more than the national median income 120 and 
possess the ability to repay at least 25% of their unsecured debt over 
five years would be unable to file under Chapter Seven.121 To 
determine whether a debtor is able to pay 25% of their unsecured 
debt in the prescribed time period, the debtor’s monthly income is 
reduced by monthly living expenses, monthly secured debt payments, 
monthly priority debt payments, monthly charitable contributions, 
and administrative and attorney’s fees.122 If the amount left over after 
these deductions is at least $100, then abuse of Chapter Seven is 
presumed.123 Debtors earning less than seventy-five percent of the 
 
 115. See supra note 1.  
 116. 11 U.S.C. § 707 (1993). 
 117. H.R. 833, 106th Cong. § 102(2)(B)(I)(III) (2000). A judge cannot convert a petition 
for Chapter Seven to Chapter Thirteen without the debtor’s consent. Id. If the debtor refuses the 
conversion, the bankruptcy petition is dismissed. Id.  
 118. H.R. 833, § 102(2)(c). The means test would establish a presumption of abuse. See id. 
However, there is no exact definition of “abuse” in the Code. See id.  
 119. The formula adopts the Internal Revenue Service collection standards. I.R.M., 
Handbook No. 515 § 1.3 (2000), available at http://tax.cch.com/primesrc/bin/highwire.dll. The 
amount allowed per category of expenses, for example, food, clothing, transportation, housing 
and utilities, is determined by county. Id. 
 120. National median income is $51,000 for a family of four. Michelle Singletary, 
Bankruptcy’s Personnal Toll: Consumers Get Blamed for Debt Crisis, but Creditors Play Role 
Too, WASH . POST, Sept. 27, 1998, at H2. 
 121. See S. 625, § 102. 
 122. See H.R. 833, § 102(a)(2)(A)(ii). The monthly expenses allowed by the standards are 
listed in three categories: (1) national standards; (2) local standards; and (3) other necessary 
expenses. H.R. 833, § 102(a)(A)(ii). The national standards include food, housekeeping 
supplies, clothing, services and personal care items. I.R.M., Handbook No. 5.15, § 1.B, supra 
note 119, at § 1.A. Local standards include housing and transportation, and the amounts 
allowed vary by county. Id. at § 1.B. Taxes, health care, court ordered payments and other 
various expenses related to income production fall under the other necessary expenses. Id. at 
§ 1.C. 
 123. See H.R. 833, § 102(a)(2)(I).  
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national median income, however, would be unaffected by the means 
test. This scheme removes the present discretion afforded bankruptcy 
judges in determining a debtor’s eligibility for Chapter Seven relief.  
b. Administrative Filing Requirements 
The Act makes filing for bankruptcy more difficult. Under the 
current Code, after a debtor files a voluntary petition,124 he must file a 
list of creditors, schedules of assets and liabilities, current income and 
expenditures, and statements of financial affairs.125 In addition, the 
debtor must give the bankruptcy trustee the property of the estate and 
any related documents.126 The debtor is thereafter required to attend a 
meeting of creditors and state any intention to retain secured 
property.127 The process, therefore, is relatively easy for debtors to 
understand and complete on their own. Many debtors file pro se,128 or 
hire a paralegal or other petition preparer to assist them with the 
forms.129 Although failure to correctly complete and file the forms 
 
 124. See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1994). The section reads as follows: 
[A] voluntary case under a chapter of this title is commenced by the filing with the 
bankruptcy court of a petition under such chapter by an entity that may be a debtor 
under such chapter. The commencement of a voluntary case under a chapter of this 
title constitutes an order for relief under such chapter. 
Id. An involuntary case can be filed under Chapters Seven or Eleven, the latter of which deals 
with reorganization. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1994).  
 125. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(1) (1994). “The debtor shall—(1) file a list of creditors, and 
unless the court orders otherwise, a schedule of assets and liabilities, a schedule of current 
income and current expenditures, and a statement of the debtor’s financial affairs . . .” Id. 
 126. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(4) (1994). “The debtor shall—(4) if a trustee is serving in the 
case, surrender to the trustee all property of the estate and any recorded information, including 
books, documents, records, and papers, relating to property of the estate, whether or not 
immunity is granted under section 344 of this title . . .” Id.  
 127. See 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) (1994). This section, “Meetings of creditors and equity 
security holders,” mandates a meeting of creditors within a reasonable time after the debtor 
files. 11 U.S.C. § 341(a). 
 128. Debtors may file with the assistance of counsel when they anticipate actions filed by 
their creditors. Id. 
 129. Congress addressed the proliferation of services available for preparing bankruptcy 
petitions by non-attorneys by imposing a “[P]enalty for persons who negligently or fraudulently 
prepare bankruptcy petitions.” See 11 U.S.C. § 110(I)(1) (Supp. 2000). The notes of the House 
Judiciary Committee illustrate the impetus behind the provision by stating:  
[b]ankruptcy petition preparers not employed or supervised by any attorney have 
proliferated across the country. While it is permissible for a petition preparer to 
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will result in a dismissal of the bankruptcy petition,130 the 
straightforward filing process tends to offset the concern over adverse 
results.  
The Act increases the informational requirements for filing and 
includes forms that are complicated and lengthy.131 Petitioners must 
provide three years of tax returns,132 as well as detailed financial 
information concerning expenses and income. These requirements far 
exceed the information required by in the current system.133  
II. ANALYSIS 
The Act is a “mixed bag” for women and their dependents. Some 
provisions would undoubtedly improve their ability to collect support 
payments from men who file for bankruptcy. Moreover, garnishments 
and other state-imposed penalties for failure to pay support 
obligations would survive the automatic stay.134 These obligations, 
however, compete with other provisions for payment of debts like 
unsecured credit cards.135 When women are on the other side of 
bankruptcy—as debtors—they confront new filing requirements and 
the means test.136 The proposed procedural changes would make it 
more difficult for women to seek financial relief.  
Although Congress generally intended the Act to target 
bankruptcy system abusers who use bankruptcy to evade their 
financial obligations,137 the major changes proposed by the Act are 
 
provide services solely limited to typing, far too many of them also attempt to provide 
legal advice and legal services to debtors . . .. These services may take unfair 
advantage of persons who are ignorant of their rights both inside and outside of the 
bankruptcy system.  
H.R. Rec. No. 103-835, at 56 (1994). Section 110 entitles the debtor to damages if their petition 
is dismissed because of the incompetence of the preparer, including actual damages, statutory 
damages of the greater of $2,000 or twice the amount paid to the preparer, plus the costs of 
hiring another attorney and their fees. 11 U.S.C. § 110(i)(1) (Supp. 2000).  
 130. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(9) (1993).  
 131. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-833. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.  
 135. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.  
 136. See supra notes 117-22, 128-31 and accompanying text.  
 137. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.  
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aimed at all filers, and not just the abusers.138 In fact, the large 
number of bankruptcy filings may have more to do with the growth 
of the credit-based economy in the United States than individual 
abuses of the bankruptcy system. Recent studies estimate that only 
about three percent of bankruptcy filings evidence abuse.139 Thus, the 
current bankruptcy reform ultimately forces the responsibility for an 
efficient bankruptcy system on segments of society that are least able 
to pay.  
A. Women and Children Collecting Alimony or Child Support from 
Men Filing Bankruptcy 
1. Definition of “Domestic Support Obligation” 
The addition of the proposed definition of “domestic support 
obligation”140 gives the claims of women and children an advantage. 
Property settlements arising from divorce agreements would always 
be excluded from the protection of the automatic stay141 and would 
not be considered a different kind of financial agreement. As a result, 
the Act would no longer require women to litigate “nature of the 
debt”142 issues when divorce decrees contain combinations of 
alimony, child support payments, and payments for the division of 
marital debts.143 The test would be completely removed from 
bankruptcy proceedings.  
2. The Automatic Stay 
Provisions restricting the application of the automatic stay further 
 
 138. For example, the increased filing requirements and the means test make filing more 
difficult for persons who are not abusing the system and sincerely need relief. See supra  notes 
117-22, 128-31.  
 139. “[T]he evidence . . . shows that very few people—maybe 3 percent—have abused the 
law. And because of that, we are passing a draconian, harsh piece of legislation which imposes 
enormous difficulties on the poorest families, on working-income families.” 123 CONG.  REC. 
S11090 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1999) (statement of Senator Wellstone). 
 140. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.  
 141. See supra notes 61-67.  
 142. See supra notes 65-67.  
 143. See supra notes 65-67.  
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benefit the claims of women and children for support payments.144 In 
preventing the automatic stay from protecting support payments 
assigned to third parties for collection, the Act removes uncertainty 
for women who count on those payments for survival. 145 Also, 
recognizing state and federal enactments to enforce support 
provisions 146 fully advances the legislative intent behind these acts. 
This way, the Code recognizes and correctly applies the law, thereby 
balancing the individual’s interest in a financial fresh start with their 
obligation to honor family commitments.147  
3. Property Settlement Agreements as a Part of a Divorce 
The Act also eliminates some of the bankruptcy judges’ 
discretion. 148 As a result, women will no longer feel vulnerable to the 
personal predilections of judges and can count on the enforcement of 
divorce decrees whether or not their former husbands file for 
bankruptcy. This protects the public interest in ensuring that the law 
upholds and consistently enforces divorce decree obligations. This 
provision also treats all parties fairly, and prevents bankruptcy courts 
from overlooking support obligations because of tricky legal 
maneuvering. 
4. Prioritization in the Distribution of Assets 
The reprioritization of domestic support claims from seventh to 
first in the order of asset distribution149 is misleading. To the public, 
the Act appears to guarantee that support claims will be paid more 
frequently and in full. Putting domestic support ahead of 
administrative expenses,150 however, can make it impossible for any 
creditor to collect at all. Administrative expenses were originally 
prioritized first because if administrative expenses were not paid, 
 
 144. See supra notes 74-87 and accompanying text.  
 145. See supra note 85. 
 146. See supra note 86.  
 147. Singer, supra note 93, at 43.  
 148. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.  
 149. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.  
 150. See supra note 106. 
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qualified lawyers would likely decline offers to administer the estate. 
In those cases, the debtor’s assets would not be liquidated but would 
instead be abandoned and return to the debtor.151 Under the proposed 
changes, domestic support claims will similarly not be paid, despite 
their new found priority status. In order to ensure the proper 
administration and distribution of the estate, the Code has always 
earmarked administrative claims as first priority, and should continue 
to do so in he future.  
Also, reprioritization of support claims will not significantly 
change the frequency with which these claims are paid. The claims in 
categories two through six–lying between the administrative 
expenses and support claims–infrequently apply to consumer 
bankruptcy cases.152 The sort of claims in those categories include 
payments to the owners of grain facilities and fish storage and 
processing facilities.153 The Consumer Federation of America 
estimates that reprioritization of domestic support claims will only 
make a difference in 1% of consumer bankruptcies.154  
The priority of support claims does not apply to collections 
following discharge.155 The assurance the provision provides for 
priority payments concludes as soon as the legal proceedings end. 
Thus, the protection for those payments is currently very limited. In 
sum, the reprioritization of domestic support claims is only a 
superficial solution to protect domestic bankruptcy claims: 
Reprioritization does not adequately provide the assurances it appears 
to grant.  
 
 151. See generally Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 833 Before the 
Subcommittee on Commercial and Admin. Law,  106th Cong. (Mar. 18, 1999) (statement of Joan 
Entmacher), available at: http://www.house.gov/udiciary/106-entm.html (last visited May 1, 
2001). 
 152. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a); H.R. 833, § 142; S. 625 § 212. See supra note 107 and 
accompanying text.  
 153. U.S.C. § 507(a); supra  note 107.  
 154. Stephen Brobeck, Recent Trends in Bank Credit Cord Marketing and Indebtedness, 
AM. BANKR. INST., at http://www.abiworld.org/research/cfa_credit_study_7-98.html (July 13, 
1998).  
 155. See supra notes 105-07.  
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5. The Means Test 
Under the means test, more men will file under Chapter 
Thirteen.156 As a result, women counting on future installments of 
alimony or child support will have more debts.157 Under Chapter 
Seven, the slate is essentially wiped clean and few debts are left to be 
repaid.158 Domestic support obligations survive bankruptcy to then 
share in the debtor’s post-bankruptcy resources.159 As a result of 
Chapter Seven relief being foreclosed to more individuals, domestic 
support payments will become part of a larger-surviving debt pool. 
Unsecured creditors, traditionally considered a lower priority,160 will 
be elevated to the same level as alimony and child support. This 
result inverts the objectives of the Code.  
B. Women Filing for Bankruptcy 
1. Qualifying for Chapter Seven Bankruptcy 
The means test161 will prevent many women from receiving much 
needed bankruptcy relief. Statistics prove that women are the most 
financially vulnerable demographic group in the United States,162 and 
the high bankruptcy rate within this group163 is not surprising. The 
means test will force greater numbers of women into Chapter 
Thirteen, even though they may not necessarily have the financial 
resources to continue payments to unsecured creditors. Many of these 
women are single mothers who may need the extra $100 per month 
for medical expenses, school clothes, or any number of the 
unforeseeable expenses involved in raising children. 164 Often these 
 
 156. See supra notes 1, 117-22 and accompanying text.  
 157. Id. 
 158. See supra note 1.  
 159. See supra notes 62-67.  
 160. In Chapter Seven bankruptcies, unsecured debt is fully dischargeable unless the 
creditor can prove nondischargeability under U.S.C. § 523. In most cases, all unsecured debt is 
discharged. The Code prioritizes such unsecured debt beneath secured debt and the explicitly 
exempted debts enumerated in § 523.  
 161. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.  
 162. See supra notes 18-21.  
 163. See supra notes 22-25.  
 164. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.  
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women are dependent on alimony or child support payments for 
survival. Thus, when ex-husbands are delinquent or late with 
payments, many women must decide between sacrificing payments to 
creditors or foregoing necessary household expenses. The means test 
closes the door to many women who need the peace of mind afforded 
by a fresh financial start. 
2. Administrative Filing Requirements 
At a time when they can least afford it, increased administrative 
requirements will force women to come up with enough front money 
to hire attorneys in order to avoid involuntary dismissals. These 
requirements put women seeking to file for bankruptcy in a 
precarious position, and many women are still likely to file pro se 
petitions. If these petitions are dismissed for failing to meet the 
administrative procedures, the women’s financial crisis will be 
prolonged.  
III. PROPOSAL 
Domestic support claims should be moved to second in the list of 
priorities in section 507. 165 This will guarantee that administrative 
expenses are paid before assets are distributed to other claimants.166 
Domestic support obligations would be more protected than they 
would be in the current version of the Act because the assets of the 
estate would not be at risk of returning to the debtor due to the 
debtor’s inability to pay his lawyer.167 This would also protect future 
bankruptcy filings, as trustees and other administrators would be 
more willing to take on bankruptcy cases when have confidence in 
receiving payment for their services.  
The means test168 should be removed from the Act. Also, 
bankruptcy judges should retain discretion when determining the 
merit of bankruptcy petitions. These judges can consider factors that 
may affect the financial well-being of women who head households 
 
 165. See supra note 105.  
 166. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.  
 167. See supra notes 105-07, 149 and accompanying text.  
 168. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.  
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and who may not fit neatly into the rigid categories of the means test. 
If, however, Congress insists on retaining some form of the means 
test, then the test should be made more flexible in its application. 
This flexibility could be achieved by replacing the currently proposed 
IRS standards with standards that focus on a debtor’s actual 
expenses. The coupling of the judge’s discretion with the objective 
test would yield a more flexible approach—one that is more 
responsive to the needs of matriarchal families.  
Administrative procedures should be designed with the pro se 
debtor in mind. Documentation requirements and filing procedures 
should be easily understood and followed. Women should not be 
required to retain an attorney for an uncomplicated bankruptcy 
because of the risk of dismissal. Therefore, the administrative 
procedures should be re-examined.  
CONCLUSION 
Bankruptcy reform is desperately needed, and Congress can no 
longer neglect the unique situation of many women and children in 
the zeal for reform. Congress must examine the realities affecting 
women and children in the United States in order to enact reform that 
does not place the burden of change on the backs of those who can 
least bear it.  
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